How drones from the sea become a threat not because they fly, but because they reshape the architecture of control
Drones over Germany: a threatening gap in the security system. UAVs are launched not only from land but also from the sea. Since the beginning of the year, Germany has recorded hundreds of drone flights monitoring critical infrastructure, especially in the coastal regions. The targets include military facilities and critical infrastructure such as LNG terminals. However, the Bundeswehr is not always responsible: civil infrastructure falls under the jurisdiction of the police and relevant operators.
This responsibility was highlighted last weekend when special police forces from Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony stopped and searched the cargo ship "Scanlark" in the Kiel-Holtenau lock on suspicion of espionage and sabotage.
According to the Interior Ministers of Schleswig-Holstein, Sabine Sütterlin-Waack, and Lower Saxony, Daniela Behrens, the ship is suspected of serving as a "base for drone flights over key infrastructure in northern Germany." According to the Kieler Nachrichten newspaper, a drone flew over a military ship and took photographs.
The Interior Ministers emphasized the importance of cross-border actions against hybrid threats. They called the operation a "strong sign" of the constitutional state's ability to act and a demonstration of the close cohesion of the coastal federal states, which are at particular risk due to strategically important maritime infrastructure.
Available data indicates that the 75-meter-long vessel operated for the Estonian shipping company Vista Shipping Agency and was registered in the Caribbean state of St. Vincent and the Grenadines since 2006. Before Kiel, the ship was in Rotterdam, and its next destination was Finland.
However, if drones take off in international waters, no action can be taken against them. Intervention is only permitted when they enter German airspace, but "even here, the question arises as to whether jurisdiction is sufficiently clarified and whether there is an appropriate legal basis," says Schindler. According to Schindler, whether radar stations can effectively detect drones likely depends on their size. Larger drones are easier to recognize.
The Core of the Pattern
The threat is not the drone.
The threat is who is responsible for it.
The incident with the "Scanlark" ship in the Kiel-Holtenau lock is not just a "spy drone." It is a test of hybrid vulnerability, where:
- Sea = international space
- Air = national space
- Responsibility = blurred between the army, police, and operators
Who should respond—before the drone takes off?
Where the Pattern Manifests
| Level | How It Works |
|---|---|
| 🔹 Level 1: Physical Control | Ship under the flag of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (flag of convenience) → base in international waters → drone launches outside jurisdiction |
| 🔹 Level 2: Technological Control | Drone flies over:
|
| 🔹 Level 3: Informational Control | Signal: "We can observe—and you cannot stop us." This is not an attack. This is a demonstration of system vulnerability. |
| 🔹 Level 4: Consciousness | Repeated incidents create the perception: "The border no longer protects." This normalizes future actions—not just with drones, but with other means. |
Sources
Sources
- Eurointegration — Kiel raid on cargo ship Scanlark; suspected drone-launched surveillance of German navy vessel, 2025 UAV flight logs
- Glavnoe.ia — Special-police operation in Kiel; vessel search over espionage & sabotage suspicions, drones used to monitor critical infrastructure
- Euronews Russian — German drone incidents, legal-jurisdiction gaps, expert commentary on Scanlark operation
- RIA Novosti — Police statement on Scanlark crew probe for UAV-based intel collection near Kiel Canal
- VesselFinder — Technical data: MV Scanlark, 75 m LOA, flag St. Vincent & the Grenadines, pre-incident track
- MarineTraffic — AIS record & movement history for Scanlark (IMO 8505915)
- OSN Media — Brief report on German suspicion of cargo-ship espionage
All data is public, verifiable, and dated.
Connection to Other Patterns
→ Pattern #001: The Border as a Testbed — how zones with blurred jurisdiction become testing grounds
→ Pattern #005: The Baltic Testbed — how coastal states unite against hybrid threats
→ Pattern #006: The AI Flip — how civilian technologies (drones) become intelligence tools
Why This Matters
Because the drone is not the target.
It is a trial balloon.
Now:
- Who will notice?
- Who will respond?
- Who will be blamed?
Next step:
- Drone with a radiation sensor
- Drone with communication jammers
- Drone with false signals
And all this—before entering airspace.
Tool: How to Recognize a "Hybrid Base in International Waters"
(Template for analyzing any vessel, platform, or drone)
- Is the ship registered under a "flag of convenience" (St. Vincent, Panama, Liberia)?
- Does it appear in a strategically important area (port, LNG terminal, military base)?
- Is it used as a platform for drones or underwater devices?
- Is there a gap in jurisdiction between sea and air?
- Who is responsible—and who should respond first?
If "yes" to 3+—this is not a ship. It is a mobile penetration point.
Conclusion
Germany stopped the ship.
But the pattern is already in the system.
The next ship may not carry a drone.
It may simply be in the right place at the right time—and transmit data.
Because modern intelligence is not about explosions.
It is about normalizing the impossibility of control.
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